This paper analyzes features of perfect taxation -also known as optimal taxation -when one or more private markets is imperfectly competitive. Governments with perfect information and access to lump-sum taxes can provide corrective subsidies that render outcomes efficient in the presence of imperfect competition. Relaxing either of these two conditions removes the government's ability to support efficient resource allocation and changes the perfect policy response. When governments cannot use lump-sum taxes, perfect tax policies represent compromises between the benefits of subsidizing output in the imperfectly competitive sectors of the economy and the costs of imposing higher taxes elsewhere. This tradeoff is formally identical for ad valorem and specific taxes, even though ad valorem taxation is welfare superior to specific taxation in the presence of imperfect competition. When governments have uncertain knowledge of the degree of competition in product markets, perfect corrective tax policy is generally of smaller magnitude than that when the degree of competition is known with certainty.
1.

Introduction
Perfect taxation -or, as it is more commonly known, optimal taxation -typically entails distorting the economy in order to redistribute resources, provide public goods, or advance other government objectives. Tax policy is defined to be "perfect" if it minimizes distortions and thereby maximizes economic efficiency subject to meeting other government requirements. In the case of economies already distorted by imperfect competition in private markets, corrective taxation has the potential to enhance the efficiency of private resource allocation. In order to realize this potential, governments must be able and willing to use their available tax instruments in an informed and sensible fashion.
Richard Musgrave's 90
th birthday is an appropriate occasion to reexamine the features of perfect taxation, since much of Musgrave's work is devoted to characterizing optimal government policies. His influential classic The Theory of Public Finance (1959) categorizes these settings, providing nuggets of detailed insight while embedding its analysis in a general equilibrium consideration of the many ramifications of government policy. On the subject of imperfect competition, Musgrave (1959, pp. 149-150) describes the corrective subsidy, following it with the observation, "Since the assumption of pure competition is unrealistic, our earlier conclusions must be qualified accordingly. At the same time, allocation in the market is not altogether chaotic. Therefore, we are still well advised to prefer the general tax unless there is a clear case for correcting a specific imperfection."
The purpose of this paper is to consider in some detail the nature of perfect tax policies in imperfectly competitive markets. Section 2 uses a partial equilibrium setting to characterize tax policies that induce imperfectly competitive firms to select efficient output levels. These policies generally take the form of subsidies that encourage firms to expand output. Section 3 then reviews several of the general second-best welfare issues that arise whenever governments are forced to rely on distortionary tax instruments in order to raise revenue.
Section 4 analyzes the impact of distortionary taxation on the design of specific taxation in the presence of imperfect competition. The need to raise tax revenue with distortionary instruments naturally dampens the enthusiasm of the government to provide subsidies to output by firms in imperfectly competitive industries. Section 5 considers the same issues with ad valorem rather than specific taxation. While ad valorem taxes are generally welfare-superior to specific taxes in environments with imperfect competition, perfect government policy with either type of tax entails the same tradeoffs between optimal correction of market imperfection and the cost of raising revenue with distorting taxes.
Section 6 offers a numerical analysis of perfect corrective taxation (of both the specific and ad valorem variety) in a simple economy. Section 7 investigates the impact on government policy of uncertainty over the degree of market competition. The perfect response to uncertainty is generally to reduce the magnitude of the corrective tax policy, since states of the world in which little or no correction is necessary are also those in which corrective policies have the greatest market impact. Section 8 is the conclusion.
Perfect commodity taxation with Cournot competition
It is helpful to start by considering the behavior of a firm acting as a Cournot competitor in an industry with a fixed number (n) of firms. 1 Firms in this industry produce homogenous products. The government imposes a specific tax on output at rate t, so firm i's profit is given by 3 (1) )
in which P is the market price of the firm's output, x i the quantity it produces, and C(x i ) the cost of producing output level x i . In this partial-equilibrium setting, it is appropriate to take P to be a univariate function of industry output, denoted X.
The firm's first-order condition for profit maximization is It is useful to consider the pricing implications of (2). Differentiating both sides of (2) with respect to t, taking 2 to be unaffected by t, and limiting consideration to symmetric equilibria (so that n
, and, since dX dP
is the elasticity of the inverse demand function for X. From (3), it is clear that dt dP can exceed unity, a possibility that is consistent with the firm's second-order condition for profit maximization and with other conditions (discussed by Seade, 1980a Seade, , 1980b that correspond to industry stability. The possibility that dt dP exceeds unity corresponds to situations in which the specific tax is overshifted. Overshifting has intrigued public finance economists at least since the time of Edgeworth.
Equations (2) and (3) identify the potential welfare impact of taxation in the presence of imperfect competition. From (2), the combination of imperfect competition (2 > -1) and a downward-sloping inverse demand function ( 0 < dX dP ) implies that firms choose output levels at which price exceeds marginal cost. Hence there is deadweight loss in the absence of taxation, and, in this simple partial equilibrium setting, tax policies that stimulate additional output reduce deadweight loss, while those that reduce output increase it. In some circumstances the imposition of a tax may reduce industry output sufficiently that after-tax profits actually rise.
Tax policy can be used to reduce or eliminate the allocative inefficiency due to imperfect competition, though other policy instruments (such as antitrust enforcement) are also typically available and may be more cost-effective at correcting the problem. 2 Taking alternative remedies to be unavailable, the perfect policy, if the government has access to lump-sum taxation, is to guarantee marginal cost pricing by setting
corrective method entails subsidizing the output of the imperfectly competitive industry.
Quite apart from what might think about the normative desirability of offering subsidies to oligopolists, 4 any such corrective scheme encounters three immediate difficulties. The first is that government funds used to subsidize the output of oligopolists must be obtained with taxes that typically distort the rest of the economy. The second is that the degree of competition in an oligopoly is typically not known with certainty. And the third is that subsidies encourage industry entry, which can reduce the oligopolistic cohesion of competitors but may do so at the cost of wasted resources, since a firm's average cost typically exceeds its marginal cost in these settings. Sections 4 and 5 consider the implications of distortionary taxation for perfect corrective taxation and Section 7 introduces uncertainty. 
Optimal taxation
In order to evaluate the effect of costly tax revenue on the design of perfect corrective policies, it is necessary to impose an exogenous revenue requirement on a setting in which the government has access to distortionary tax instruments. Ramsey (1927) introduced this problem and analyzed its main features. This section first reviews the properties of the basic Ramsey result and then considers important extensions to cases in which producer prices change and in which there are consumption externalities.
3 Such a corrective subsidy was proposed by Robinson (1933, pp. 163-165) , who attributes it to her husband and presents it as an "ingenious but impractical scheme." For an elaboration, see Higgins (1943) . 4 See Musgrave (1976) .
Distortionary tax revenue
The simplest version of the Ramsey tax problem abstracts from population heterogeneity and posits that the government must raise a fixed sum of tax revenue with proportional commodity taxes, leaving to the side how such revenue is to be spent. With a population of identical individuals, typically analyzed as a single representative individual, the goal of perfect tax design is to minimize the excess burden associated with raising the needed revenue. We typically rationalize government's inability to use lump-sum taxes by saying that such taxes are inequitable, although this may seem a bit forced in a setting with identical individuals. It may help to think of this simple problem as a necessary building block, rather than as one that adequately models a realistic situation.
The representative consumer maximizes utility, U(x), over a vector of commodities x i (i = 0,1,..., N), subject to the budget constraint p⋅x ≤ y, where p is the corresponding vector of consumer prices and y is lump-sum income. To raise the required level of revenue, R, the government imposes a vector of specific taxes on the commodities, t, driving a wedge between consumer prices and producer prices, q. It is useful to assume initially that this vector of producer prices is fixed. With given producer prices, the government in setting tax rates is effectively choosing the consumer price vector, since p=q+t. Thus, the government's optimal tax problem can be modeled as
where V(⋅) is the household's indirect utility function.
With no lump-sum income, two tax systems are equivalent if they differ by proportional taxes on all commodities. Without lump-sum income one is therefore free to normalize one of the taxes, say on good 0, to zero, and for convenience choose the same good as numeraire, i.e., q 0 = p 0 =1. The maximization problem in (4), with the multiplier µ associated with the budget constraint, yields N first-order conditions: is the "social" marginal utility of income that includes the value of the additional tax revenue raised when the household receives another unit of income. 6 Before interpreting expression (6), it is useful to consider the more general case of variable producer prices.
Changing producer prices
Since the excess burden of a tax is a function of the extent to which the tax changes producer prices, it follows intuitively that allowing producer prices to vary alters the first-order conditions for the optimal tax schedule. Let the general production be characterized by
where z is the production vector and perfect competition insures that q i /q j = f i /f j ∀i,j. Without loss of generality, the units of the production function can be chosen such that q i = f i . If there are constant returns to scale, then f(⋅) is homogeneous of degree zero in z. Otherwise, there may be pure profits, π = q'z > 0.
With changing producer prices, it is not appropriate to specify the constraint in the optimal tax problem as a scalar value of tax revenue to be collected, so it is necessary to posit that the government absorbs a vector R of commodities. This implies that the consumption vector x satisfies f(x+R) ≤0, thereby incorporating both revenue and production constraints. The optimal tax problem, then, is to maximize the indirect utility function V(p,π) subject to this constraint, and not that given in (4). The associated Lagrangean expression is
and the government's problem is still that of choosing the consumer price vector p, rather than the tax vector t, even though the relationship between changes in the two vectors is more complicated than when producer prices are fixed. 7 The resulting first-order conditions are (using the normalized form of production function) 8 (9) N i dp dx q dp
As discussed in Auerbach (1985) , dp/dt= [I-HS] -1 , where H is the Hessian of f(⋅), so there is a one-to-one relationship between changes in t and changes in p as long as [I-HS] is of full rank.
Differentiating the household's budget constraint p'x = π with respect to p i yields (10) N i dp d dp (11) N i dp d dp dx t x dp
Since producer prices, and hence profits, change with p, the derivative dx j /dp i in (11) includes the indirect effect of p i on profits through changes in production:
Using this and the above definition of the marginal social utility of income, α, (11) can be rewritten as
or, using the Slutsky decomposition, as (14) N i dp
which differs from expression (6), the first-order condition in the case of fixed producer prices, by the term dπ/dp i on the right side. Thus, if there are constant returns to scale (π≡0), the firstorder conditions are identical (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971) . The same is true if the government imposes a pure profits tax, so that the after-tax value of y accruing to households is uniformly zero (Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971) .
The left side of (14) equals the marginal excess burden associated with an increase in p i .
The second term on the right side of (14) is the net compensation required to maintain the individual's utility as p i rises 9 which, by definition, exceeds the marginal revenue raised by the marginal excess burden induced by the price change. Thus, (14) says that the excess burden of a marginal increase in any tax must be proportional to the sum of marginal revenue plus marginal excess burden, or:
(15) d EB dp dR dp d EB dp i N
It follows that the marginal excess burden per dollar of revenue raised, (µ-α)/α, is also constant, which is an intuitive condition for minimizing the total excess burden induced by raising a given amount of revenue from alternative sources.
Externalities
A similarly intuitive set of results appears when the simple Ramsey problem is extended to incorporate externalities, as in Sandmo (1975) . Suppose that an externality, E, enters into 9 This term equals dy y dV i dp y dV
; according to Roy's identity, this equals the net increase in income required to maintain the household's utility level as p i increases. each person's utility function and cannot be avoided, so that the representative individual's indirect utility function may be written V(p;E). Suppose also, for simplicity, that the externality is the product of aggregate consumption of a single good, say the good with the highest index, N.
Then, the Lagrangean,
implies the following N first-order conditions with respect to the prices of goods 1,…, N (compare to 6): (17) is the standard perfect tax solution, except that it calls for the tax on the externality-producing good, N t , to equal the sum of the "perfect" tax that ignores the externality, * N t , plus a term that reflects the cost of the externality. This second term equals the corrective Pigouvian tax -the social cost per unit of consumption of the good, measured in terms of the numeraire commodity -divided by the marginal cost of public funds, µ/λ.
Perfect specific taxation with distortionary tax instuments
In order to explore the impact of distortionary taxation on perfect corrective taxation, consider the setup of section 3.1, in which all commodities are produced at constant cost. There are N+1 commodities, of which the first N, indexed 0,…, N-1, are produced by competitive firms, and commodity N is produced in an imperfectly competitive market whose pricing satisfies (2). 10 Denoting the (constant) per-unit production cost of commodity i by q i , it follows
. As in section 3.1, we assume that the tax on the numeraire commodity, good 0, equals 0. Firms in the imperfectly competitive industry generate profits, and someone in the economy receives these profits as income. 11 Taking consumers in the economy to be identical, it follows that the utility of the representative consumer can be represented by
in which p is the vector of N+1 commodity prices, and B represents profits earned by the imperfectly competitive firms. Commodity demands are then functions of (p, B), but to simplify the calculations that follow, we consider the case in which firms ignore the indirect impact of their pricing decisions on demand through induced changes in profits. The representative firm's first-order condition for profit maximization becomes
. Thus, the price-cost margin imposed by imperfect competition is
The optimal taxation problem can be conveniently analyzed by maximizing (18) over the choice of p, t N , and B, subject to the constraints that
This approach to the optimal tax problem defines tax rates on the first N-1 commodities implicitly by the relationship 
in which, as before, the Lagrange multiplier : is associated with the revenue constraint, while the new Lagrange multipliers ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 correspond to the additional constraints (20) 
The first-order conditions corresponding to choices of t N and B are given by (23) 0
To simplify and interpret these first-order conditions, we note first that by substituting (23) into (22b), we obtain (22a), for i = N. Thus, this expression holds for i = 1,…, N. Next, it is possible to combine (23) and (24) to solve for the multipliers ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 in terms of other parameters. Doing so, we find that
, which was defined in section 3.1 as the "social" marginal utility of income, α, and that
, which expresses the deadweight loss associated with the restriction of good-N consumption.
Substituting these expressions into (22a), we obtain the following expression for i=1,…, N:
The second term in brackets in (25) (20) and (21) together imply that
, it is possible to rewrite (25) as
is the total wedge in market j, equal to t N + m in industry N.
Equation (26) would be optimal fully to correct for the extra distortion in industry N and then impose the standard perfect taxes. Presumably, the net result in industry N would be an incomplete offset of the oligopolistic mark-up, the optimal tax component normally being positive. The second term in brackets in (26) accounts for the existence of profits, taking the form laid out in expression (13) above and explained in that context. In this instance, tax-induced price changes affect the profitability of the imperfectly competitive industry, the difference (:-") capturing the welfare effect of increasing industry profits by one unit. To the extent that a higher price of a commodity directly or indirectly augments oligopoly profits, this must be included in computing the price change's overall welfare effect. Doing so has the effect of making the price increase less attractive as a policy tool.
Although the preceding derivation of expression (26) elucidates the role played by taxes in influencing the noncompetitive industry's mark-up, one may arrive at the same result more directly by incorporating the constraints of the problem in a different manner. Doing so also
facilitates an extension to the case in which more than one industry is noncompetitive. Assume that the revenue constraint still obeys (19), but that profits are now:
where the characterization of producer behavior in noncompetitive industries j > M is
where n j and θ j are defined for industry j in the usual way. Combining (20') with the revenue constraint, (19), we may recast the problem as one of maximizing (18) with respect to p, subject to the constraint, With µ defined as the multiplier of the constraint given in (27), the first-order conditions for this problem are:
where, as before, λ is the marginal utility of income and α is the "social" marginal utility of income. This may be rewritten to produce expression (26) above, with * j t , j > M, equal to the total wedge in industry j.
The preceding discussion presumes that the government is unable to use a complete set of tax instruments, being restricted instead to linear taxes on output. If the government has access to a tax on pure profits, then it can improve efficiency by using it. A 100 percent pure profit tax would effectively remove the i dp dπ term from equation (26), thereby modifying the perfect output tax configuration to consist of Ramsey-like revenue raising taxes plus a corrective subsidy to output in the imperfectly competitive industry. The use of pure profit taxes together with other tax instruments relies, however, on the ability of the government to identify pure profits with precision in all situations. Consequently, in the analysis that follows the government is assumed not to have the option of imposing pure profit taxes.
Specific and ad valorem taxation
In competitive markets the distinction between specific and ad valorem taxation arises only from minor tax enforcement considerations. In imperfectly competitive markets these two tax instruments are no longer equivalent, since the imposition of an ad valorem tax makes the tax rate per unit of sales a function of a good's price, which is partly under the control of individual firms. As a result, ad valorem and specific taxes that raise equal tax revenue will typically differ in their implications for economic efficiency, ad valorem taxation being associated with much less deadweight loss. 14 Intuitively, ad valorem taxation removes a fraction (equal to the ad valorem tax rate) of a firm's incentive to restrict its output level in order to raise prices.
Welfare effects
Now, the government is assumed to have access both to an ad valorem tax and to a specific tax. In this setting the firm's profits equal
in which J is the ad valorem tax rate. Assuming the n-firm outcome to be symmetric, the firstorder condition for profit maximization becomes
and its pricing implications are
Since a unit change in J raises more tax revenue than does a unit change in t, it is unsurprising that dt dP d dP > τ . Much more revealing is the effect of these tax instruments normalized by dollar of marginal tax revenue. Since total tax revenue is given by Rev = τPX+tX, it follows that
In this simple partial equilibrium model, the change in deadweight loss associated with one of these tax changes is equal to the product of the induced change in X and the difference between marginal cost and price. Consequently,
which, together with (34a) and (34b), implies that
, so if tax revenue is an increasing function of tax rates, then the right side of (35) is greater than unity. Hence revenue-equal substitution of ad valorem for specific taxation reduces deadweight loss at any (t, J) combination. 15 Of course, such substitution works at the expense of firm profitability, and would, if used excessively, drive profits negative and supply presumably to zero. But assuming the firm profitability constraint not to bind, the optimal tax configuration entails ad valorem rather than specific taxation.
Optimal taxation with distortionary ad valorem tax instruments
The preceding comparison of ad valorem and specific taxation compares their effectiveness per dollar of foregone revenue, but does not address the question of the optimal rate of ad valorem taxation when the government is unable or unwilling to provide specific subsidies.
While this problem is typically thought (e.g., Myles, 1989) to entail a very different solution than that for specific taxation, properly framed it becomes clear that the solution has the same character regardless of the type of available tax instrument.
Following the analysis of specific taxes, we seek to maximize the indirect utility function in (18) subject to the revenue constraint, 15 Consequently, if the government is able to impose negative specific taxes (specific subsidies), then it can completely eliminate the distortion due to imperfect competition through a judicious combination of ad valorem tax
the definition of profits,
( )
, and the characterization of producer behavior:
As before, we express this as a problem of choosing the consumer prices, p, by using (38) to eliminate t from the problem and using (37) to substitute for the explicit expression for the markup, m. The result is that we may rewrite the problem as one of maximizing (18) and specific subsidy, as noted by Myles (1996) . The effectiveness of this corrective method is limited by any constraints on ad valorem tax rates, such as a restriction that they be nonnegative.
Note that expression (40) differs from (28) by the term multiplying φ j X j on the right-hand side of (40), which equals (1-τ j ). Otherwise, the problem is identical to that for specific taxes, and the first-order conditions given in (26) still hold, for τ i inserted in place of t i /p i . The resulting equilibrium will generally be different, of course, because profits, and hence the terms dπ/dp i , will be different.
An example
In order to illustrate the tradeoffs implicit in corrective tax policies with imperfect competition, it is useful to consider a concrete example. Suppose that the economy consists of identical consumers with utility functions over two goods, 1 and 2, and leisure of the form,
where the exponents β i sum to 1. This is the Stone-Geary or displaced Cobb-Douglas specification, where the quantity a of good 1 may be interpreted as a basic need. If a >(<) 0, then good 1 is a relative necessity (luxury).
We assume that the labor market and the market for good 1 are competitive, but that the market for good 2 is noncompetitive in the manner discussed above. The market demands for goods 1 and 2 are:
where y is the household's full income, equal to its labor endowment plus profits.
From expression (26), we obtain the following expressions for perfect taxes on goods 1 and 2, assuming that labor is untaxed:
which, rewritten using the demand expressions in (42) 
The implications of these conditions depend on the manner in which taxes are imposed.
For specific taxes, because the elasticity of demand for good 2 is unity, the mark-up in industry 2 is, from equation (21):
. Because the household's full income, y, equals its labor endowment, say L, plus π, one may express profits in terms of underlying parameters as:
Using this expression, it is possible to rewrite the first-order conditions in (44) as
In (47a), the impact on profits of an increase in the price of the competitive good depends on the sign of a. (The corresponding term in (47b) is zero, in this case.) If a is positive (negative), this impact on profits is negative (positive), which will contribute, ceteris paribus, to a higher (lower) tax on that good. As will be seen shortly, this effect works in the same direction as the tax differential prevailing in the absence of imperfect competition. Rearranging expression (47b) in terms of the proportional wedge, 2 * 2 / p t , and substituting this expression into (47a), we obtain the following expressions:
These expressions are informative about the ways in which different parameters affect the relative tax rates on goods 1 and 2. Consider first what happens in the absence of imperfect competition (n=∞ or θ = 1). In this case, taxes on the two goods will be equal only if β 3 = 0 (in which case labor is supplied inelastically and a uniform tax on the two goods is nondistortionary) or a = 0 (in which case neither good is a relative necessity). Introducing imperfect competition works to enlarge the differential wedge between the two industries, based on the full wedge in industry 2, * 2 t . However, there are limits to the conclusions one can draw based on these expressions, because they are not complete solutions for the tax rates, but depend on multipliers that are themselves endogenous. Also, the conditions for the ad valorem tax case, using the mark-up condition based on (38) instead of (45), yields somewhat messier conditions than (48a) and (48b). Thus, for further insight, we turn to numerical simulations. Table 1 presents simulations for this Stone-Geary case, for a range of values of the basic need, a, and the mark-up term, (1+θ)/n. In all simulations, the intensity parameters β i each equal 1/3, the value of the labor endowment and all producer prices equal 1, and required revenue equals 0.1. For ease of comparison, the taxes presented are in specific units, rather than as a fraction of the price, even in the case of ad valorem taxation.
There are a number of interesting results one can observe from inspection of the table.
First, for all variations in the preference parameter a, the total wedge on the taxed good increases with the degree of noncompetitiveness, as tax reductions occur but do not completely offset the extra wedge induced by increases in (1+θ)/n. For all values of a, the tax on the competitive good rises with the mark-up in industry 2, as needed to reduce the tax rate on the noncompetitive good. Following the intuition provided based on expressions (48a) and (48b), the wedge under specific taxation between * 2 t and t 1 grows with (1+θ)/n, becoming more negative when a>0, more positive when a<0, and remaining constant when a=0.
When (1+θ)/n > 0, the tax on good 2 is generally higher in the case of ad valorem taxation, because the ad valorem tax acts to moderate noncompetitive behavior. Because of this moderation, the total wedge facing purchases of good 2 is sometimes lower under ad valorem taxation, despite the higher tax. The one exception to the rule of higher taxation of good 2 under ad valorem taxation is in the last row of the table. Here, the tax on good 2 is initially low, even without noncompetitive behavior, because good 1 is a relative necessity (a > 0). As (1+θ)/n rises, this contributes to a further lowering of t 2 , to the point that it becomes negative when (1+θ)/n = .2 -corresponding to a five-firm industry under Cournot conjectures. However, once the tax rate on good 2 is negative, applying it as an ad valorem tax exacerbates noncompetitive behavior. This can be seen by the fact that the mark-up (the difference between t 2 and * 2 t ) is higher for the ad valorem tax case in this row, in contrast to the rest of the table.
Uncertainty
One of the difficulties facing tax authorities attempting to implement perfect corrective policies is that the extent of imperfect competition in an industry is generally not known with certainty. This section explores the impact of uncertainty on the design of corrective policy. We consider the case in which the extent of competition, as captured by 2, is unknown. As in section 4 above, the government has access to specific tax instruments with which to tax industries producing output at constant costs. As a result, the government directly controls the prices of commodities other than that produced by imperfectly competitive firms. We also assume here, to keep the analysis tractable, that the government has no revenue needs and has access to lump-sum taxation.
Taking the measure of welfare to be expected utility, the government maxmizes
in which p 0 is the vector of N commodity prices for goods produced by firms in competitive industries, p N is the price of the output sold in the imperfectly competitive industry, B represents profits earned by the imperfectly competitive firms, and T equals lump-sum taxes. E[A] is the expectations operator.
The government selects a vector of commodity taxes t and lump-sum taxes T to maximize (49) subject to:
Denoting the imperfectly competitive markup ( )
by m, it follows that the government maximand can be written as:
in which use is made of reduced-form functions to denote the dependency of m and X j on prices and income that in turn are functions of t and 2. The first-order conditions corresponding to the maximum of (53) over the choice of the elements of the vector t are:
In the absence of uncertainty over the value of 2, it is clear that (54) with marginal nominal income. The extent to which 2 affects 8 is, however, attenuated by the reduced utility due to monopoly, and the associated higher marginal utility of income.
It is useful to put risk considerations aside, in order to focus on issues that are specific to the imperfectly competitive setting of the problem. To do so we take 8 in (54) to be unaffected by 2, and consider the simplifying case in which
. Then (54) implies:
Denoting the expectation of m, (55) 
then the first order condition (55) becomes:
This condition is satisfied when
so that the optimal tax rule is:
Equation (59) (59) is negative.
States of the world in which 2 takes a high value are also states of the world in which higher tax subsidies are relatively less effective at stimulating demand. It follows that states of the world in which 2 is small also those in which tax subsidies have a significant impact on resource allocation. The relative ineffectiveness of tax subsidies when needed (i.e., when 2 is large) makes the perfect corrective tax policy smaller in magnitude than it would be if the degree of competition were known with certainty.
In order to see this relationship more clearly, consider the case of a linear demand curve, for which
is constant. In this case, (57) becomes:
In order to interpret (60), it is useful to refer to equation (3) Combining (52) and (60) - (62) produces the first-order condition: 
Conclusion
The ability of the government to alter private incentives through the tax system affords policymakers a range of options that are often more attractive than regulatory alternatives. When it is possible to identify imperfectly competitive market structures, an appropriate set of taxes and subsidies can be used to correct misallocations due to oligopolistic price-setting. These taxes and subsidies reflect a tension between the efficiency gains from subsidizing output in the imperfectly competitive sector of the economy and the cost of taxing the rest of the economy to pay for the subsidies. In those cases in which the extent of competition is not known with certainty, a more moderate set of corrective taxes and subsidies is typically indicated.
The focus of this analysis is the efficiency of resource allocation, which, while perfectly appropriate for economic research, represents only a part of the information necessary in order to implement sound policy. Musgrave (1959, p. 157) reminds the reader that "the avoidance of excess burden is only one consideration among others in choosing between different taxes." He continues (p. 159), "Society must ask itself what price, in terms of excess burden, it wishes to pay to secure certain policy objectives. In this sense, the narrow criterion of efficiency as avoidance of excess burden must be subordinated to a broader concept of efficiency under which conflicting objectives are reconciled." The reconciliation of these diverse objectives is the task of political and social organizations whose job is made easier by its thoughtful conceptualization in the work of Richard Musgrave and others. , in which x 1 is consumption of commodity 1, x 2 is consumption of commodity 2, l is leisure, and a denotes the consumer's basic need for commodity 1. Commodity 1 is produced by a competitive industry, while commodity 2 is produced by an imperfectly competitive industry consisting of n firms, each of which selects its output level with a conjectural variation of 2. Thus, lower values of [(1+2)/n] correspond to greater industry competition. Consumers have unit wages and unit labor endowments, and constant producer costs of both commodities are fixed at unity as well. The government's revenue requirement equals ten percent of the economy's labor endowment. t 1 and t 2 are tax rates on commodities 1 and 2 respectively, while
